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JUDGE THEODORE MCMILLIAN: A TRIBUTE 
THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. ARNOLD* 
It is a real pleasure to write a few words in tribute to my colleague and 
friend, Judge Theodore McMillian.  The Judge and I started out together, in a 
way, so far as the federal bench is concerned.  President Carter nominated him 
to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit at about the same 
time as I was nominated to the District Court in Arkansas.  Judge McMillian 
and I appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee for our hearing on the 
same day in 1978.  I am happy to record that the hearing was brief, almost 
perfunctory, for both of us, something that cannot often be said in these more 
heatedly political times.  That was a kinder and gentler age, in which most 
hearings on judicial nominations, except for the Supreme Court, were nothing 
more than formalities to ratify a decision already made.  I will never forget 
Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton’s moving tribute given to Judge McMillian 
on the day that the Senator presented him to the Committee. 
I soon learned that one of the chief joys of a judgeship in the Eighth Circuit 
was the opportunity to read the slip opinions that came out week by week from 
the Court of Appeals.  Please notice the phrase “week by week.”  In those 
days, before the caseload had become so oppressively high, a bundle of slip 
opinions would arrive in the mail once a week.  Now, they come every day in a 
torrent that is continuously increasing.1  Anyhow, as a district judge, it was of 
course my duty to become familiar with Eighth Circuit opinions and apply 
them faithfully in cases that came before me.  I soon learned that Judge 
McMillian’s opinions were among the most enjoyable: invariably well 
researched, thoroughly reasoned, and (what is probably too much to expect) 
interesting to read. 
One such opinion from those early days sticks out in my recollection. 
Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5 was argued while I was still on the 
 
* United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit 
 1. During the first year of Judge McMillian’s tenure on the Court of Appeals, 970 appeals 
were filed.  MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1980 8 (1980) 
(charting statistics for the year ending June 30, 1979).  My first year, the number rose to 1,147 
appeals.  Id. (charting statistics for the year ending June 30, 1980).  The increase has been steep 
since then.  In the year ending December 30, 1998, 3,255 appeals were filed. STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (Dec. 31, 1998). 
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District Court, and was filed shortly after I became a circuit judge.2  Judge 
Heaney, Judge Ross, and Judge McMillian comprised the panel.3  Judge 
Heaney wrote for the Court, and Judge McMillian dissented.4  The case was 
about Christmas.  Specifically, the issue before the court was whether 
Christmas assemblies, including the singing of Christmas carols, conducted in 
the public schools of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5  The Court held that the 
assemblies, including the carols, were not intended to advance religion.6  The 
Court said that the principal or primary effect of the assemblies neither 
advanced nor inhibited religion, but rather promoted secular interests in 
cultural diversity and knowledge.7 In the Court’s view, the school board’s 
administration of its rules and policy regarding Christmas assemblies did not 
excessively entangle the schools in religion.8 
Florey is one of those cases which a judge instinctively knows has a 
popular side and an unpopular side.  Most people in this country, I dare say, 
would identify themselves as Christians, even if only casually so, and most 
people, at least before they have thought much about it, would see no harm in a 
public school assembly marking such an important day of the year.  It takes a 
brave judge to go against this popular public belief and express reservations 
about such governmental promotion of religion.  Voting against Santa Claus, 
not to mention Jesus, makes the judge look like the “Grinch who Stole 
Christmas.”  But the Founders gave us life tenure9 for a purpose.  They knew 
that judges would be human beings, subject to all the frailties of that species.  
Consequently, they gave us a protected tenure and security against pay cuts, 
enabling us to make unpopular decisions, whenever, in the exercise of our 
consciences, we feel that the law demands it.  Judge McMillian’s dissent in 
Florey is an outstanding example of that judicial courage that the Framers 
sought to protect. 
The dissent is worth re-reading from time to time.  The point of my present 
comments is not how Florey would be decided today, or whether the Court or 
the dissent made the better argument.  Rather, I offer the Florey dissent as an 
 
 2. 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 3. Id. at 1313. 
 4. Id. at 1313, 1320. 
 5. Id. at 1312. 
 6. Id. at 1313.  The school board adopted “Rule 1,” which allowed observation of holidays 
that had “both a religious and a secular basis,” but prohibited observation of “solely religious” 
holidays. Id. 
 7. Florey, 619 F.2d at 1316-17 (noting that “carols have achieved a cultural significance 
that justifies their being sung in . . . [Sioux Falls] public schools”). 
 8. Id. at 1318. 
 9. We hope that is what “during good behavior” means. 
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outstanding example of judicial craftsmanship.  Judge McMillian’s opinion 
began by carefully disclaiming any hostility towards religion.10 Indeed, Judge 
McMillian remained quite sensitive to the place of religion in our national life, 
not to mention our personal lives.11  He recognized that the Establishment 
Clause was intended not only to protect government from being taken over by 
religion, but also to protect religion from being taken over by government.  It 
has rightly been said of the history of the Establishment Clause that “our 
tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas Jefferson 
but also on the fervent sectarianism . . . of a Roger Williams.”12 
Judge McMillian’s dissent took on the Court point by point.  He conceded 
that teaching about religion as part of a curriculum, say of music or art, is not 
unconstitutional.13  Indeed, it would be bad educational policy to ignore it.  In a 
particularly nice turn of phrase using a music metaphor, the Judge noted that 
“nothing in my analysis would limit a music curriculum to fugues and minuets, 
and exclude oratorios.”14 
Judge McMillian believed that the Court’s position could not withstand the 
three part test for the Establishment Clause15 set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman.16  
Initially, there could be no doubt that holding a Christmas assembly was 
partially motivated by religious purposes.  Otherwise, why have the assembly 
at all?  The school board could have allowed discussion of Christmas’s cultural 
and musical history in the classroom as part of the regular curriculum without 
holding a special program at which Christmas carols were sung.  It is difficult 
to derive much secular significance from “Silent Night” or “O Come All Ye 
Faithful,” both of which were sung in these assemblies.17 
The dissent especially criticized the Court’s conclusion that Christmas had 
acquired a “secular basis.”18  The school board’s rules allowed celebration of 
listed holidays that had “a religious and a secular basis” including Christmas, 
Easter, Passover, Chanukah, Valentine’s Day, St. Patrick’s Day, Thanksgiving, 
and Halloween.19  It is hard not to share Judge McMillian’s puzzlement: 
 
 10. Florey, 619 F.2d at 1320-21. 
 11. Id. at 1325 (acknowledging that Christmas “remains an event of immense and 
undiminished significance to Christians”). 
 12. Id. at 1328. 
 13. Id., 619 F.2d at 1321. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Florey, 619 F.2d at 1321-24. 
 16. See 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (requiring that a statute “must have a secular purpose, a 
principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster an 
excessive government entanglement with religion”). 
 17. See Florey, 619 F.2d at 1323. 
 18. See generally id. at 1314-16 (“Christmas[] has ‘acquired a significance no longer 
confined to the religious sphere of life.’ “) (citation omitted). 
 19. Id. at 1325. 
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I find it very difficult to articulate what is meant by “secular basis” and to 
discern the secular basis of some of the holidays (i.e., Easter) . . . [and] what is 
meant by “religious basis[]” [of] . . . holidays like Valentine’s Day . . . . 
Despite its many and diverse secular manifestations, Christmas . . . [u]nlike 
Thanksgiving . . . has no inherent secular basis as the anniversary of an 
American historical event.20 
The Judge further noted that the school board’s rules excluded Rosh 
Hashanah and Yom Kippur from the list, although the goal of cultural diversity 
would probably be better met by having a student body, which was presumably 
majority Christian, study these Jewish holy days.21 
Judges taking such a position lay themselves open to the charge of being 
hostile towards religion.  Judge McMillian recognized this danger, observing 
that his “analysis may be regarded by some as hypersensitive or even 
antireligious.  It is not.”22  I think Judge McMillian was right in making this 
observation.  In fact, if we start emphasizing the “secular basis” of Christmas 
or Easter, and justify governmental observance of these days for that reason, 
are we not watering down their religious significance?  Jesus either got up out 
of the grave on Easter Sunday, or He did not.  To reduce the observance to 
Easter eggs, baby chicks, and rabbits23 actually trivializes religion by in effect 
telling the public that it is all right for government to observe these days 
because they really don’t mean much, anyway, in this enlightened modern 
world.  I congratulate Judge McMillian on having the courage and wisdom to 
reject this seemingly popular view.  His opinion was probably unpopular at the 
time, and would still be so today.  But I venture to say that his position may not 
only be more faithful to the First Amendment, but also more respectful of true 
religion. 
Long live the Bill of Rights!  Long live Ted McMillian! 
 
 
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 1324. 
 22. Florey, 619 F.2d at 1329. 
 23. Presumably these symbols would be part of the “secular” basis of Easter. 
